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Abstract: This paper examines how starting one’s career in a weak labour market affects 
future labour market outcomes using data from 13 European countries. Income losses, so 
called scarring effects, are found to be solely levied on college graduates. For every 
percentage point increase in the national unemployment rate at graduation, college 
graduates incur wage penalties of 2% one year later. These penalties are over 1% for the 
next eight years but are zero by year ten. During the Great Recession, college graduates 
in countries who experienced harsh sovereign debt crises were particularly affected. In 
Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain new graduates with a college education 
faced wage losses of between 12 and 23% in each of the first ten years of their career. 
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The early part of a worker’s career is an important determinant of future financial success. Wage 
growth is at its highest (Murphy and Welch 1990) and job-switching is frequently used to 
increase wages (Topel and Ward 1992) . Recent evidence from Lagakos, Moll, Porzio, Qian, & 
Schoellman (2018) also points to the substantial variation in lifecycle wage growth across 
countries. Wage growth profiles are predominantly concave in developed countries but have a 
flatter, linear profile in developing countries. Notably, German workers see wages grow by over 
100% over the first twenty years of their careers. Workers in the United States, United Kingdom 
and Canada experience more modest growth of 75% in the same period. In both cases however, 
most of this wage growth occurs in the first decade of a worker’s career. While the first decade 
of experience is clearly important, part of this impact can be traced as far back as the first job a 
worker attains. Devereux (2002) highlights the state-dependence of wages in the United States 
labour market; for two identical workers beginning their careers at different wage levels, half of 
this wage differential is still present five years later. Given the importance of early career wage 
growth, how does a young worker commencing their career in the depths of an economic 
downturn fare? 
 At first glance, it seems the issue may be trivially borne by a small group of unlucky cohorts 
relative to the size of the labour market, and in aggregate the social costs will be minimal. This is 
not the case however. While the possible negative wage effects are indeed levied at the worker 
level, there are also implications for the health of the economy in other respects. Stuart (2019) 
shows that the 1980-1982 recession in the United States led to 1-3 million less college graduates 
and a reduction in earned income between $64 and $145 billion. Clearly, wage penalties borne 
by individuals can materially impact public finances and the skill levels of the future workforce. 
An appreciation of this subject is important for policy makers as there may be tools at their 
disposal which can mitigate these longer run implications. 
In this paper I examine how an increase in the national unemployment at the outset of young 
workers’ careers impact their labour market outcomes over the first decade of their career. 
Numerous authors have examined this topic internationally1. I examine the subject from a 
European perspective. I examined how earnings, wages and hour worked for employees in 
1 See Oreopolus et al. (2012) in the case of Canadian college educated workers. Schwandt & von Wachter (2019), 
Speer (2016), Khan (2010), Altonji et al.(2016) and Oyer (2006, 2008) have examined how recessions affect various 




European countries are affected by variation in initial labour market conditions. I look at workers 
who finished their education between 1987 and 2014 using survey micro data from 13 countries.  
The evidence on wage scarring across European countries is very varied. Wage scarring 
estimates are generally found to be negative, but the duration and types of workers affected vary 
across countries. In some settings, more educated workers suffer the largest losses (Cockx & 
Ghirelli, 2016) while others have found that negative penalties are mainly levied on the less 
skilled workers (Haaland (2018); Fernandez-Kranz & Rodriguez-Planas (2018); Umkehrer 
(2019)). Despite numerous studies of individual countries, little is known about wage scarring 
processes in the largest labour market in Europe- the common labour market of European Union 
member countries.  
I contribute to this literature by estimating scarring models at the common European labour 
market level using a sample of long-standing member countries. As the common labour market 
is large, an appreciation of how new workers are affected by recessions is an important feature to 
understand. I find income losses, in wages and earnings, are exclusively levied on college 
graduates. For every 1 percentage point increase in the national unemployment rate at 
graduation, college graduate incur wage penalties of 2% one year later. These penalties are over 
1% for the next eight years but are zero by year ten. Earnings losses tend to be larger than wage 
losses in the first two years after graduation, as hours worked decrease slightly. Consistent with 
estimates from the US and Canada, both earning and wage losses tend to dissipate after a decade.   
I offer one particularly novel contribution. I simulate the heterogenous effects of the Great 
Recession upon young workers in countries who experienced a harsh sovereign debt crisis 
(Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain) and the non-crisis countries in my sample. The 
results are striking. New college graduates in non-crisis countries experience negative wage 
penalties for ten years, these are close to 3% in each year. However, new college educated 
workers in crisis countries fare much worse. They incur wage losses of over 20% one year after 
graduation. This decreases below 15% by year six but these losses are around 20% seven to ten 
years after graduation. These estimates show that the Great Recession had a particularly large, 
negative effects for college graduates in crisis countries, where unemployment rates increased 






A large literature has sought to isolate the causal effect of early career unemployment upon 
future wage outcomes. One of the earliest examinations of the topic came from Ellwood (1982). 
Using a panel of young American men, he found that early career unemployment lent itself to 
reductions in future wages but did not change the probability of future employment. Another 
early piece, by Franz et al. (2000), found that Germans failing in apprenticeship training schemes 
incurred persistent income losses thereafter. In Denmark, Rosholm (1997) found that young 
males entering the weak Danish labour market of the 1980s had a higher risk of becoming 
marginalised if they did not acquire work experience shortly after school completion.   
This early literature examining recessions and youth labour markets transitions showed the 
negative effects induced by a lacklustre start. From an econometric stance, the methods were 
dogged by endogeneity grievances. For instance, it’s unclear whether the types of young people 
who fell into unemployment differed on some unobservable (e.g. motivation etc.) from those 
who found employment. If they are, estimates will be biased. Neumark (2002) addressed these 
concerns and was the first author to use the unemployment rate in the early part of a worker’s 
career as an instrumental variable for job security upon graduation.  More recent wage scarring 
research has adopted this reduced form approach, often implicitly, and have estimated how 
variation in the national/local unemployment rates affect outcomes of young workers during the 
early part of their career. 
The onset of the financial crisis of 2008 gave researchers increased impetus to examine the role 
of macroeconomic conditions on future career outcomes. Most of the research in this field has 
revolved around labour markets in North America. Schwandt & von Wachter (2019) examine a 
broad range of workers in the United States who began their careers between 1976 and 2015 by 
pooling waves of the Annual Economic Supplement to the Current Population Survey, the 
American Community Survey and Decennial Census. The authors examine whether scarring 
estimates from starting one’s career in a weak labour market vary by race, gender and 
educational attainment. They find an average worker incurs losses in the region of 60% of a year 
of earnings over the course of a decade if starting their career in a typical US recession. Men and 
women experience similar losses while non-whites and the least educated workers incur the 




While providing general estimates for an “average worker” in an economy is of interest, many 
authors have focused solely on college graduates for methodological reasons. College graduates 
are more likely to immediately search for work upon graduation and are less likely to have 
substantial compositional changes over the business cycle (Oreopolus et al., 2012). This thinking 
means that identified wage scarring effects are more likely to be true, causal effects rather than 
correlations biased by unobserved confounders in cohort quality. Using a matched employer-
employee dataset Oreopolus et al., (2012) found that Canadian college graduates starting in a 
recession suffer wage losses of 9% initially, with the effect diminishing over a ten-year period. 
The predicted quality of the graduate also played a role in determining the duration of the effect. 
Graduates whom had a high predicted wage based on degree type and institution quality incurred 
smaller and less persistent losses. This finding ties with Altonji et al., (2016) who found that 
higher earning majors are less likely to suffer high wage penalties and are more likely to find 
work in high paying occupations. Oyer (2006, 2008) conducted two studies examining the 
outcomes of specialised college graduates in the form of PhD economists and MBAs 
respectively. Weak market conditions upon graduation negatively affected lifetime earnings for 
MBA graduates and reduced placement prestige for new PhD economists. 
Taken collectively, the North American literature gives evidence that wage scarring effects are 
sizable and typically last a decade. Across skill groups there are varying conclusions however. 
Speer (2016) concluded that low skilled labour incurs large initial losses, but these are not 
evident after the first year of experience, whilst college graduates are faced with persistent 
losses. In contrast, Schwandt & von Wachter (2019) found that least educated workers incur the 
largest and most persistent income losses. 
While there is some variability in findings in North America, the recent European literature has 
been very varied. In the United Kingdom, Cribb, Hood & Joyce (2017) find that recessions result 
in wage losses for up to a decade. However, losses are much less persistent when family income 
is examined. If we assume income sharing occurs this indicates that living with a spouse or in the 
home of birth has an income protection effect. Other authors have sought to differentiate losses 
based on educational attainment. Haaland (2018) and Fernandez-Kranz & Rodriguez-Planas 
(2018) find that lowest skilled workers suffer the largest and most persistent wage losses2. Cockx 
 




& Ghirelli (2016) find opposing results. In Flanders, minimum wage laws offer wage protection 
to less educated men in a recession. As a result, more educated men are more adversely affected 
by recessions at the point of labour market entry. In the German setting, Stevens (2008) found no 
evidence of persistent wage penalties from starting one’s career in the depths of a recession. 
However, Umkehrer (2019) finds that low ability German apprentices tend to be more negatively 
affected in recessions than their more skilled counterparts - a similar within skill group narrative 
as found in Oreopolus et al., (2012) and Altonji et al., (2016). While most studies indicate wage 
penalties are felt for close to a decade, Gaini, Leduc & Vicard (2012) find that these effects were 
very transitory in the French labour market, lasting just three years. 
When analysing the European literature, it’s unclear what portion of the variation in results 
across countries is driven by variation in: 1) data sources/quality 2) empirical techniques and 3) 
true population effects. More precisely, it’s difficult to say, unequivocally, that reported 
differences are entirely due to true population effects as the econometric specifications and data 
used vary across studies. While there appears to be substantial variation across countries, little is 
known about how recessions affect workers in the common European labour market. My 
analysis uses harmonised cross-country data sets to estimate wage scarring effects for new 
workers in the European labour market for 13 member countries. I make no onerous sample 
selection assumptions and examine workers irrespective of their educational attainment or 
gender. This flexibility is important as it allows for a more accurate representation of how a 
recession affects the average worker while also allows for an exploration of possible 
heterogenous effects. 
 
Data and Empirical Strategy 
Data Sources 
I use two nationally representative pan-European surveys in my analysis. The first of these is the 
European Community Household Panel Survey (ECHPS) from 1995-2001. The ECHPS is a 
longitudinal survey which ran from 1994-2001 before being replaced by, the second data set I 
use, the Survey of Income and Living Conditions (SILC) in 2004. SILC is a cross-sectional 
survey conducted annually. It also has a longitudinal component, with a portion of households 
surveyed in a given year resampled for between one and three more years. I use SILC waves 




namely: Denmark, Finland, Austria, Portugal, Spain, Greece, Belgium, the Netherlands, the 
United Kingdom, France, Ireland, Italy and Germany. These are all long-standing members of 
the European Union. All these countries were members of the European Union by 1995, the first 
year of data I use to estimate wage scars.  
All ECHPS waves provide income data on a current basis, namely, the last weekly wage 
received. SILC income data is reported on an annual basis3. I make these comparable by dividing 
the SILC income by 52 and using this as a measure of weekly earnings. I divide these weekly 
earnings measures by hours worked per week to derive hourly wages. My sample is made up of 
individuals aged 16 to 35 who completed their education between 1987 and 2014. I restrict my 
sample to natives, defined as people born in the country of observation. This is important as I do                             
not wish for varying skill levels of migrants across countries to influence my scarring estimates. I 
adjust all nominal earnings and wages to be in constant 2017 US purchasing power parity 
dollars. The country level PPP conversion factors come from OECD (2019a) and I then convert 
these into constant dollars by inflating each wage series by US CPI growth to 2017.  
I look solely at employee income in estimating scarring effects. This is a common feature of the 
literature. As most young workers will work as employees, it is the most relevant channel in 
which scarring will present. Both surveys also have rich information on educational attainment4, 
the year in which the highest educational qualification was attained5 and nationality.  
I use a harmonised measurement of unemployment rates derived by the OECD (2019b). This 
approach means that variation in initial labour market conditions, my identifying variation, is 
consistently measured across countries and within countries over time. In Table 1 show the 
variation in unemployment rates across countries for cohorts who began their careers between 
1987 and 2014. Spain (5.2%), Greece (6.6%) and Ireland (4.7%) have the most volatile labour 
markets, with high standard deviations in national unemployment rates over the period.  
[[Table 1 near here]] 
 
 
3 In the last calendar year for all countries except Ireland, where earnings in the past 12 months are reported. 
4 Educational attainment in both surveys is defined in line with the International Standard Classification of 
Education system. This means that educational attainment is consistently defined across surveys and across 
countries. 





I follow the recent literature, Oreopolus et al., (2012) and Schwandt & von Wachter (2019) and 
estimate a cell-based model which aggregates labour market outcomes at the country (c), 
graduation cohort6 (g), educational attainment (d), potential experience (e) and year (t) level. 
This approach also allows me to work on a level close to my identifying variation- national 
unemployment rates at the cohort level. I estimate a baseline model identical to that used by 
Schwandt & von Wachter (2019). Schwandt & von Wachter exploited cohort-state level 
variation in unemployment rates to assess scarring in the United States. With this approach I treat 
countries in my sample as they treat states, and I derive scarring estimates at the European level, 
where they derive them at the national level. The baseline model regresses a cell level average of 
outcome Y onto a series of fixed effects: country (c), year (t), potential experience7 (e), cohort 
(g) and educational attainment8 (d). For outcomes I examine the log of hourly wage (wages), log 
of weekly wage (earnings) and log hours worked for all employees in my sample. My sample is 
made up of close to 250,000 employees before collapsing to the cell level. 
𝑌 , , , , = 𝑎 + 𝐵 + 𝜕 + 𝛾 + 𝛿 + 𝜌 + 𝛽 , (𝑈𝑅 ,  𝑋 𝑃𝑜𝑡. 𝐸𝑥𝑝 ) 
(1) 
A common theme in this empirical literature is an acknowledgement that fixed effects in cohort, 
year and potential experience are collinear9. I opt to drop one cohort (those graduating in 2014) 
and estimate experience and year effects. I am treating cohort effects as a “nuisance parameter”, 
as does most of the wage scarring literature10. In a static setting, fluctuations in cohort size can 
lead to decreased wages due to an increased supply of labour. In this setting, early career wages 
are decreasing in cohort size. I model these cohort effects at the European labour market level 
using fixed effects. This assumes cohort size at the European level is the relevant channel, rather 
 
6 For ease, I use cohort to imply graduation cohort for the remainder of the text. 
7 Potential experience is used as actual experience or years worked will be endogenous to initial labour market 
conditions. I used the terms “time since graduation” and “potential experience” interchangeably as they are 
equivalent.   
8 A dummy variable for college graduate or non-college educated workers. 
9 Potential experience is defined as: (year of observation) – (cohort graduation year). Clearly potential experience is 
a linear function of year and cohort effects. For this reason, fixed effects in all three cannot be identified. 
10Rothstein (2019) is an exception. He explicitly models cohort effects in order to decompose transitory scarring 




than national fluctuations in cohort sizes. While flexibility modelling cohort sizes at the national 
level would also be desirable, I am limited in my ability to do so. I identify scarring effects by 
exploiting variation in national unemployment rates across cohorts. A series of country-level 
fixed effects in cohort size would swallow all this identifying variation. 
The scarring parameters are identified in 𝛽 , . Scarring effects are identified as an interaction 
between fixed effects in years of potential experience and the cohort national unemployment 
rate, 𝑈𝑅 , . These scars can be interpreted as the deviations from the typical European 
experience profile of outcome, Y. I flexibly model the scarring process by using fixed effects in 
potential experience. This allows me to estimate a detailed profile of scars from career 
commencement to a decade into an employee’s career11. The scarring estimates can be 
interpreted causally if the cohort national unemployment is exogenous- this is an identifying 
assumption. I assume people do not account for conditions in the national labour market when 
deciding when to complete education. 
I also estimate additional regression equations which allow for more heterogeneity in how 
outcomes, Y, evolve across countries. In Equation 1, an average experience profile for European 
countries is estimated. Average European wide scarring effects are then identified as deviations 
from this average experience profile induced by spikes in cohort national unemployment rates in 
individual countries. I augment Equation 1 by also estimating regressions which fit country 
specific experience profiles alongside an average European experience profile. This approach 
allows for experience profiles of wages and other outcomes to be estimated at the country level, 
while wage scarring effects are measured as a European average. Lagkos et al., (2018) show that 
there is substantial variation in wage-experience profiles across developed countries. 
Appreciating this stylised fact and allowing returns to experience to vary at a national level, 
while estimating aggregate European scarring effects is an important robustness check in a cross-
country wage scarring study. In contrast, most of the wage scarring literature examines a single 
country and exploits variation in unemployment rates of regional labour markets (states in the 
case of the US or municipalities of varying definitions in Europe). In a given country, there will 
be less variation in the returns to experience across regions than will be the case across countries. 
 
11 Another option is to interact cohort unemployment rates with a linear trend in experience. This implies that the 




As such, the inclusion of unit specific returns to experience is important in a cross-country 
setting but less so in a country level study. In Equation 2 I include a country specific experience 
trend and in Equation 3 I include a series of country-experience fixed effects. In estimating all 
these models, I cluster my standard errors at the country-cohort level to account for serial 
correlation of outcomes of individuals beginning their careers in the same economic setting. I 
estimate Equations 1, 2 and 3 for my entire sample of employees. I also examine whether 
scarring effects are heterogenous by estimating the three models separately by educational 
attainment12 and by country type13.  
𝑌 , , , , = 𝑎 + 𝐵 + 𝜕 + 𝛾 + 𝛿 + 𝜌 + 𝐵 + 𝛽 , ( 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑋 𝑃𝑜𝑡. 𝐸𝑥𝑝 )
+ 𝛽 , (𝑈𝑅 , 𝑋 𝑃𝑜𝑡. 𝐸𝑥𝑝 ) 
(2) 
𝑌 , , , , = 𝑎 + 𝐵 + 𝜕 + 𝛾 + 𝛿 + 𝜌 + 𝐵 + 𝛽 , ( 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑋 𝑃𝑜𝑡. 𝐸𝑥𝑝 )





I estimate Equations 1, 2 and 3 for my full sample of employees. I refer to Equation 1 as my 
baseline model as it is a specification common to the literature. Equation 2 augments the baseline 
model with a country specific experience trend. Equation 3 adds a series of country experience 
fixed effects to the baseline model. 
The scarring estimates for these three models are plotted for log hours worked, log hourly wage 
and log weekly earnings in Figure 1. These are also in tabular form in Appendix Table A1. In the 
baseline model scars on earnings and wages are small and not statistically different from zero in 
the first four years after graduation. The baseline scars are close to 1% for every 1 percentage 
 
12 Those with and without a college degree. 
13 Those who experienced a harsh sovereign debt crisis during the financial crisis-Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece 




point (ppt.) increase in national unemployment rate (UR) at graduation from years five to ten. 
Once a country specific experience effect, either trend or fixed effect, are added the results vary. 
These result in larger losses, of 2% for every 1 ppt. increase in UR at graduation in year one. 
These losses decrease rapidly in experience and are not statistically different from zero after 
three years at the 95% confidence level.   
There is also a noticeable labour supply effect, with hours worked decreasing by 0.5% for every 
1 ppt. increase in UR at graduation. This reduction in hours worked effect decrease in experience 
and are present for six years in the baseline model and five years in models with country specific 
experience profiles. In all models there is a spike in hours worked of close to 0.5% nine to ten 
years after graduation for every 1 ppt. increase in UR at graduation. This increase in hours 
worked is likely a supply side response. As hourly wage scars tend to zero, hours worked 
increase in response to a higher real wage.  
The hourly wage scars I estimate in Panel B of Figure 1 are very similar to those estimated in a 
recent comparable study of a broad class of employees in the United States by Schwandt & von 
Wachter (2019). Schwandt & von Wachter found that a 1 ppt. increase in the state UR at 
graduation led to just over a 1% decrease in hourly wages for the first five years of experience, 
with losses of close to 0.5%for the next five years.  My point estimates are similar to these, 
although with much larger standard errors, once experience variants across countries are 
accounted for. Despite the noise around the estimates, it is surprising that hourly wage losses in 
the face of a common shock, 1 ppt. increase in unemployment, results in similar effects on wages 
years later. This highlights that wages for new workers in the European labour market are quite 
flexible and can adjust downward in the face of an adverse shock.  
[[Figure 1 near here]] 
 
Schwandt & von Wachter found that annual earnings losses were much larger than hourly wage 
losses. This effect was amplified by both weeks worked per year and usual weekly hours being 
reduced in the face of an unemployment shock at graduation. The earnings scars I calculate are 
based on weekly earnings and are smaller than US estimates as I cannot incorporate decreases in 




While on aggregate, the wage and earnings scar estimated seem non-trivial, the standard errors 
on the estimates are quite large meaning these estimates are typically not different from zero at 
the 95% confidence level. In addition, the results vary across models. These noisy estimates for a 
broad class of work could mask large negative effects certain workers face. To assess if this is 
the case I estimate how these wage scarring effects vary for employees based on educational 
attainment- a common theme in the literature, and across countries- a margin unique to a cross-
country study.  
Educational Attainment 
I estimate Equations 1-3 separately for those who have a college degree and those who do not. 
This is equivalent to estimating these equations with a set of dummies for educational attainment 
interacted with each variable. This allows experience, year, country and scarring effects to vary 
based on educational attainment. The estimated scarring effects have a within-group 
interpretation. They are the penalties incurred, at each level of experience, for a ppt. increase in 
UR for college (non-college) graduates compared to college (non-college) graduates who did not 
incur this UR increase at graduation.  
My results indicate that scarring is very different based on educational attainment. In Figure 2, I 
plot scarring estimates for both educational groups. These are also tabulated in Appendix Table 
A2. What’s clear is that losses for college graduates, in both hourly wages and weekly earnings, 
are large, persistent and very similar in all three models estimated. Hourly wages are lower by 
2% for the first three years and close to 1.5% for years four through nine for every ppt. increase 
in UR at graduation. By year ten, the estimates are smaller than 1% and not different from zero. 
Earnings losses tend to be larger in early years of experience, due to a decrease in hours worked 
in the first two years of experience worked- 0.5% for every 1 ppt. increase in UR. As hours 
worked increase in years eight to ten, by just under 0.5% for every 1 ppt. increase in UR at 
graduation, earnings14 losses tend to converge to zero faster than wages. 
[[Figure 2 near here]] 
There is no evidence of any income losses for lower skilled labour owing from starting their 
career in a weaker labour market. For wages and earnings, all three models suggest scars for non-
 




college educated employees are not statistically different from zero and point estimates are 
generally small. These results complement research by Cockx & Ghirelli (2016) who found that 
college educated workers incurred larger and more persistent income losses from beginning their 
career in a recession in Flanders. Minimum wages in Europe act as a wage floor and truncate 
losses, offering additional protection to low-skilled labour during a recession who find 
employment.   
Crisis countries  
European countries had very different experiences in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. 
Between 2008 and 2012, the Greek labour market saw unemployment rates rise from 7% to 24%. 
Spain experienced a comparable spike while Ireland, Italy and Portugal saw rates rise by over 5 
percentage points. In contrast, Austria saw next to no change in unemployment while Belgium, 
Finland and France had very little upward movement. Germany even experienced a decrease in 
unemployment over the crisis- with unemployment rates falling from 7.4% in 2008 to 5.4% by 
2012. I examine possible differences emerging across countries by grouping countries based on 
how severely they were affected by the Great Recession. I define crisis countries as Portugal, 
Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain - the so called “PIIGS” during the downturn. These countries 
had the most severe sovereign debt crises during the Great Recession alongside the largest loss in 
employment. I compare scarring dynamics in these crisis countries with the other countries in my 
sample by estimating Equations 1-3 separately by country type. I only examine college graduates 
in these country type regressions. From Figure 2 it’s apparent that income scars are levied at 
college graduates and not less educated workers. 
These regression results are displayed in Figure 3. For crisis countries, a 1 ppt. increase in UR at 
graduation is associated with a 2% decrease in earnings/wages in year one. These losses decrease 
slightly by year six. In years seven they increase, and by year ten statistically significant losses of 
over 1% are still evident. All three models estimated yield very similar results on this front.  
Scarring estimates on wages and earnings tend to be larger for non-crisis countries. These have a 
far larger confidence interval however, so it’s unlikely that scars in crisis and non-crisis will be 
statistically different from one another. Income losses over 3% are evident in the first year of 
experience in the baseline specification. Including additional controls for country-experience 




model specification. However, scarring point estimates from years two to ten always exceed 1% 
and are typically as large as 2% for every ppt. increase in UR at graduation. 
[[Figure 3 near here]] 
These results indicate that young workers in crisis and non-crisis countries both face income 
penalties when faced with rising unemployment on labour market entry. However, a reader 
should not conclude that the effects of the Great Recession in crisis and non-crisis countries are 
comparable. Unemployment rates increased significantly more in crisis countries than in non-
crisis countries, therefore the total impact of the Great Recession will be much larger in crisis 
countries. From 2007-2012, unemployment rates increased by 10.87 percentage points in crisis 
countries. This was much lower, at just 1.05 percentage points in non-crisis countries15. I 
simulate the effect that these unemployment changes would have on hourly wages by rescaling 
the scarring estimates from the baseline model (Equation 1) in Figure 3 (B1 and 2), for crisis and 
non-crisis countries by the average jump in unemployment rates in crisis and non-crisis countries 
from peak to trough of the Great Recession (2007-2012). These simulated wage scars are 
presented in Figure 4. It’s clear that cohorts in crisis countries face much larger wage losses, of 
over 20% in year one, before decreasing below 15% by year six and subsequently hovering 
around 20% in years seven to ten. Losses are much smaller, close to 3% in any given experience 
year for cohorts in non-crisis countries. These estimates show that the Great Recession had 
differential effects across Europe, with very large penalties likely to be borne for cohorts in crisis 
countries.  
[[Figure 4 near here]] 
Sensitivity Analysis 
Possible sources of bias 
The scarring parameters I estimate can be biased from endogenous labour market entry and 
cyclical migration. These are issues in country specific studies such as in the United States- see 
Schwandt & von Wachter (2019), these will also need to be accounted for in a cross-country 
study. In short, both these sources of endogeneity could lead to variation in cohorts over the 
business cycle.  
 





Endogenous labour market entry: People may choose to alter their educational attainment if 
they wish to avoid a weak initial labour market. Micklewright, Pearson, & Smith (1989) argue 
that high unemployment interacts with educational attainment in three ways. Firstly, high 
unemployment may decrease the opportunity cost of education and will encourage remaining in 
full-time education. Secondly, unemployment of other household members may encourage 
individuals to leave education and look for work. Thirdly, high unemployment may generate 
more uncertainty about the returns to education and will lead risk averse individuals to reduce 
their optimal schooling. Overall, these effects are conflicting and the effect of a recession on 
schooling rates will vary depending on the relative strength of each channel. 
It’s clear though, that if educational attainment is linked to the business cycle this increases the 
likelihood that individuals starting their careers in a recession may be systematically different on 
some traits (observable or otherwise). While ex ante, we cannot determine the sign the bias, 
nevertheless we ought to be aware of the possibility. This would introduce a self-selection bias to 
the estimated scarring effects as there could be underlying productivity differences between 
those workers who chose to continue in education and those entering the labour force in a 
recession. 
Endogenous migration: Another form of selection bias could be introduced if international 
emigration occurs in response to adverse economic conditions. If this occurs, there is likely to be 
substantial bias embedded in the country level data I use for my analysis. This may be 
particularly true of smaller European countries, with the Irish case during the financial crisis 
springing to mind. The number of people leaving Ireland rose threefold from 2006 to 2012 in the 
aftermath of the Great Recession (Central Statistics Office, 2019). In the UK, Ireland’s nearest 
neighbour, fewer people migrated in 2012 as compared to 200616 (Office of National Statistics, 
2019). 
Strategic labour market entry 
Up to this point I have assumed that the cohort unemployment rate was exogenous, meaning the 
business cycle did not affect educational attainment rates. This is an identifying assumption, but I 
can get a sense of its validity by plotting cohort educational attainment rates against lagged 
 
16 36,000 emigrate Ireland in 2006, rising to 83,000 by 2012. In the UK 341,000 emigrated in 2006 with this number 




unemployment rates. I do this in Figure 5, where I plot the portion of each cohort17 with a college 
degree against the unemployment rate one and four years prior to graduation. In the first case, if 
cohort college attainment rates are correlated with the lagged unemployment rate, this indicates 
that college graduates are likely prolonging their time in college by completing master’s degrees 
etc. This would result in the probability of being a college graduate being acyclical, but across 
college graduates there would be cyclical variation in years of education. However, if attainment 
rates are more correlated with lagged unemployment rates four years prior to graduation, this 
would indicate that the unemployment rates at high school completion influence a young 
person’s decision to attend college. If such a pattern emerged, one could reasonably conclude 
that the decision to attend college is itself very cyclical. This would result in substantial cyclical 
variation in cohort quality, which would bias identified scarring estimates.  
I use cohorts from 2003 to 2013 to isolate how educational attainment rates may have been 
affected by the Great Recession. From Figure 5 it is clear that there is variation in college 
attainment. At the lowest point, 45% of new employees in 2006 had a college degree in contrast 
to the high of 57% in 2013. The most striking pattern is the steady rise in college completion 
rates for new employees from 2010 to 2013, rising by 10 percentage points. This pattern is 
highly correlated with unemployment rates the year before graduation and seemingly unrelated 
to unemployment rates four years prior to graduation. Based on this evidence, I assume that 
education is related to the business cycle. However, I conclude that patterns in unemployment 
rates do not lead individuals to pursue a college education. Rather, those who would already 
receive a college education increase their years of schooling- by completing a masters degree, 
PhD etc. As such, I assume that the types of people emerging as college graduates (broadly 
defined) is not cyclical.  
[[Figure 5 near here]] 
I integrate this conclusion into an instrumental variable strategy to assess the possible bias that 
this cyclical variation in years of schooling may introduce. I instrument actual year of graduation 
with a simulated year of graduation. For college graduates, I instrument the national 
unemployment rate at age 22 for the cohort unemployment rate. For non-college graduates, the 
 





national unemployment rate at age 18 instruments for the cohort unemployment rate. I limit my 
sample of college graduates to be aged between 23 and 32, so that I now estimate scarring 
parameters up to ten years since simulated graduation year (or equally since age 22). I do the 
same for non-college educated, with the sample comprising of those aged 19 to 28. In Figure 6 I 
plot this age-educational attainment UR against the cohort UR. It’s clear that the two variables 
are highly correlated, meaning the instrument will be very strong. I estimate the model via two-
stage least squares regression. My first stage regression is shown in Equation 5. I use the same 
cell average approach as in Equations 1, 2 and 3. I pool college and non-college educated 
together and predict the cohort unemployment rate 𝑈𝑅 ,  based on cohort (c), year (t), 
experience (e), educational attainment (e) and the cell average age-educational attainment 
unemployment rate, 𝑈𝑅 , , .  In the second stage, the predicted values from the first stage are 
used to estimate scarring parameters arising from the simulated graduation year. This set-up is 
identical to Equation 1 and I also estimate models which include country specific experience 
trends and fixed effects as per Equations 2 and 3. In estimating these models I just examine log 
hourly wages. My key assumptions in this set-up are: 
 The exclusion restriction holds, namely cov((𝑈𝑅 ,  , 𝜀 , , , , )=0. It’s reasonable to 
assume that national unemployment rates young workers face at specific ages are 
exogenous. A person may be able to manipulate their cohort unemployment rate by 
adjusting their time in education, but as a person cannot adjust their age, age-based 
unemployment rates will be exogenous. As a result, these won’t be correlated with 
unobserved factors captured in the error term of the second stage wage regression. 
 I assume that unemployment rates at 18 don’t influence the likelihood that an individual 
completes college. Recessions can lead non-college graduates to stay in high school until 
graduation or forego completing high school, while they lead college graduates to adjust 
their years of college education. Educational attainment is cyclical on the intensive 
margin in this set-up, while types (non-college/ college graduate) are acyclical. 
 






𝑌 , , , , = 𝑎 + 𝐵 + 𝜕 + 𝛾 + 𝛿 + 𝜌 + 𝛽 , (𝑈𝑅 ,  𝑋 𝑃𝑜𝑡. 𝐸𝑥𝑝 ) + 𝜀 , , , ,  
(6) 
 
In Appendix Table A3, I show reduced form estimates from Equation 6 and in Appendix Table 
A4 I show instrumental variable results from estimating Equations 5 and 6. For all specifications, 
wage scars for non-college educated workers are small and not different from zero. Similarly, the 
reduced form and instrumental variable results for college graduates are comparable to my main 
estimates (show in Appendix Table A1). This indicates that possible endogenous entry into the 
labour market does not materially impact my findings. 
Endogenous international migration  
The ECHP and SILC do not contain a full migration history of individuals. I also do not observe 
workers who leave the country after an unemployment shock. Using national level data to 
estimate scarring effects on a sample of “stayers” would result in biased estimates if there are 
systematic differences between those who emigrate and those who stay after a recession. 
However, it’s likely that migration is less of an issue in a cross-country setting. Flows of people 
will likely be lower across countries than across local labour markets such as US states. As such, 
an advantage of this research design is that estimates are less likely to be biased by flows of 
people across countries in response to unemployment shocks. 
In any case, I make an allowance for international migration and assess how it affects my 
scarring estimates for hourly wages. I estimate the stability of native population in each of my 
sample countries. I do so by using the World Bank Global Bilateral Migration database18. For a 
given country, this database shows where all migrants residing in the country were born. These 
data are predominantly based on census data, but population registers and nationally 
representative surveys are occasionally used. For all 13 countries in my sample I construct a 
measure of how mobile each country’s native population is. This the number of natives not living 
in the country divided by the national population. Formally, for a given country a, in year t, I 
create a migration rate R as: 
 
18 These data are freely available at: https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/global-bilateral-migration-database . I 











This is the sum of all natives of a country a living in all other countries i to j globally, in year t. I 
divide by the population of country a in year t  to get a sense of scale of migrants globally. These 
migration rates are stocks rather than estimates of flows- as I do not know when a native of 
country a emigrated to another country. I calculate the ratios in ten-year intervals from 1970-
2000. I then average these estimates to get a long-run average of population mobility. These 
migration rates are displayed in Table 2. 
[[Table 2 near here]] 
 Ireland (30.2%), Portugal (16.2%) and Greece (11.4%) have the most migratory native 
populations. As a robustness check I estimate my IV models but exclude these three high 
migration countries. The results for college graduates are very similar, a 1 ppt. increase in UR 
decreases wages by close to 2% in year one, scars of 1% are present ten years later. For non-
college graduates, there is no evidence of negative wage scarring. These results are displayed in 




The effects of recessions have interested economists, policy makers and the public. The 
academic discourse on wage scarring in Europe has been varied, with substantial variation in the 
magnitude and persistence of negative penalties across countries. 
In this paper I find that wage scarring in the European labour market is only applicable to high 
skilled labour in the form of college graduates. Wage scars are large initially, at 2% for every 
percentage point increase in unemployment at graduation. These losses fade to zero over a ten-
year horizon- in line with findings from the US and Canada.  
I also simulate the effect of the Great Recession for new college graduates in Europe. I find that 
wages decrease by over 20% a year after graduation for workers in countries most severely 




present ten years after graduation. These findings are important as they show the blunted 
financial outcomes of unlucky cohorts in the years after they face an unemployment shock.  
These results show that the wages of higher skilled new workers are very sensitive to 
macroeconomic circumstance. Unlucky cohorts, beginning their careers in a recession, bear large 
and persistent losses to the wages. From a policy perspective, the large recessions which will 
emerge in Europe from the coronavirus pandemic will result in large employment losses. 
However, policy makers ought to bear in mind that young college graduates who do find 
employment will have dampened career prospects for up to a decade.  
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Figure 1:  Scarring estimates of a 1 ppt. increase in national UR at graduation, full sample 
A. Log earnings     B.   Log hourly wage 
 
C. Log hours worked 
 
Source Author’s analysis using ECHPS 1995-2001 and SILC 2004-2015 for 1987-2014 
graduation cohorts.  
Notes:  
a. The shapes plot scarring estimates (rescaled to be expressed in percentage terms), with 
associated 95% confidence interval from Equations 1-3.  
b. “Baseline” is Equation 1. “Country Specific Experience Trend” is Equation 2. “Country 
Specific Experience Fixed Effects” is Equation 3.  







Figure 2: Scarring estimates of a 1 ppt. increase in national UR at graduation, by educational 
attainment     
A1. Log earnings: college graduate   A2. Log earnings: non-college 
 
B1. Log hourly wage: college graduate  B2. Log hourly wage: non-college 
 





Source Author’s analysis using ECHPS 1995-2001 and SILC 2004-2015 for 1987-2014 
graduation cohorts.  
Notes:  
a. The shapes plot scarring estimates (rescaled to be expressed in percentage terms), with 
associated 95% confidence interval from Equations 1-3.  
b. “Baseline” is Equation 1. “Country Specific Experience Trend” is Equation 2. “Country 
Specific Experience Fixed Effects” is Equation 3. Each equation is estimated separately 
for employees with college degrees and those without college degrees.  




Figure 3: Scarring estimates of a 1 ppt. increase in national UR at graduation, for college 
graduates by country type 
A1. Log earnings: crisis     A2. Log earnings: non-crisis 
 
B1. Log hourly wage: crisis    B2. Log hourly wage: non-crisis 
 





Source Author’s analysis using ECHPS 1995-2001 and SILC 2004-2015 for 1987-2014 
graduation cohorts.  
Notes:  
a. The shapes plot scarring estimates (rescaled to be expressed in percentage terms), with 
associated 95% confidence interval from Equations 1-3.  
b. “Baseline” is Equation 1. “Country Specific Experience Trend” is Equation 2. “Country 
Specific Experience Fixed Effects” is Equation 3.  
c. Crisis countries are Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain. Non-crisis countries are 
the remaining countries in my sample. I estimate Equations 1-3 separately for each 
country type 
d. Standard errors are clustered at the country-cohort level. Only employees with a college 

















Figure 4: Simulated hourly wage scars for Great Recession cohorts- baseline model estimates 
 
Source Author’s analysis using ECHPS 1995-2001 and SILC 2004-2015 for 1987-2014 
graduation cohorts.  
Notes:  
a. The shapes are point estimates, with associated 95% confidence interval.  
b. These are the hourly wage scarring estimates for college graduates in crisis and non-crisis 
countries from Equation 1 (baseline model results from Figure 2, B1 & B2) rescaled by 
the average jump in unemployment rates in crisis (10.87 percentage points) and non-
crisis (1.05 percentage points) countries from 2007-2012. 
c.  Crisis countries are Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain. All other countries are 
classified as non-crisis.  
 
Figure 5: Cohort educational attainment and lagged unemployment rates 





B. Attainment plotted against the average unemployment rate four years prior to graduation 
 
Source Author’s analysis of SILC 2004-2017 
Notes: The dots are the portion of a given cohort in employment one year after graduation who 
have a college degree. The bars are the lagged cohort unemployment rates. In A this is the 
unemployment rate the year before the cohort finished education. In B this is the unemployment 
rate 4 years before the cohort finished education. 
 
Figure 6: Plot of cohort unemployment rates and age-educational based unemployment rates 
 
Notes: The cohort unemployment rate is on the Y-axis. The instrument, age-educational 
unemployment rate is on the X-axis. A line of best fit plots the correlation between the 






Table 1: Cohort unemployment rates for sample countries, 1987-2014 
Country Average (%) Standard Deviation (%) 
Spain 16.4 5.2 
Greece 13.7 6.6 
Ireland 10.6 4.7 
France 10.0 1.4 
Finland 9.5 3.5 
Italy 9.4 1.7 
Belgium 8.1 1.0 
Portugal 8.1 3.4 
Germany 7.6 1.9 
UK 7.0 1.7 
Denmark 6.0 1.6 
Netherlands 5.7 1.4 
Austria 4.5 0.7 
  
 
Table 2: Migration rates among sample countries 














Source World Bank Global Bilateral Migration database 
Notes: The migration rates are estimated for 1970, 1980, 1990 and 2000 using Equation 7. The 
average of these values is shown. These represent the long-run ratio of natives living in all other 










Table A1: Scarring estimates, full sample  
 Earnings  Log Hours Worked Log Hourly Wage 
Years Since Graduation (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
1 -0.005 -0.015 -0.026 -0.004 -0.004 -0.006 -0.001 -0.011 -0.020 
 [-0.585] [-1.612] [-2.530] [-2.916] [-2.532] [-3.909] [-0.144] [-1.328] [-2.093] 
2 -0.009 -0.017 -0.019 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.013 -0.016 
 [-1.539] [-2.520] [-2.922] [-3.804] [-3.486] [-3.247] [-0.935] [-2.079] [-2.467] 
3 -0.008 -0.014 -0.012 -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 -0.005 -0.012 -0.010 
 [-1.446] [-2.286] [-1.878] [-3.268] [-2.631] [-1.118] [-0.991] [-2.004] [-1.774] 
4 -0.011 -0.014 -0.008 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 -0.008 -0.012 -0.007 
 [-1.880] [-2.468] [-1.432] [-2.936] [-2.445] [-1.032] [-1.520] [-2.270] [-1.333] 
5 -0.010 -0.012 -0.008 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.008 -0.011 -0.006 
 [-1.786] [-2.124] [-1.389] [-1.988] [-1.352] [-1.908] [-1.587] [-2.096] [-1.099] 
6 -0.011 -0.011 -0.005 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.009 -0.010 -0.004 
 [-2.301] [-2.337] [-1.045] [-2.517] [-1.445] [-0.793] [-1.988] [-2.245] [-0.902] 
7 -0.010 -0.008 -0.007 0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.010 -0.009 -0.008 
 [-2.097] [-1.625] [-1.132] [0.073] [1.302] [0.988] [-2.106] [-1.922] [-1.411] 
8 -0.010 -0.006 -0.007 0.001 0.002 0.003 -0.011 -0.009 -0.010 
 [-2.276] [-1.252] [-1.123] [0.827] [2.082] [2.078] [-2.484] [-1.785] [-1.716] 
9 -0.008 -0.002 -0.004 0.003 0.005 0.005 -0.011 -0.007 -0.008 
 [-1.801] [-0.382] [-0.577] [3.079] [4.514] [3.122] [-2.727] [-1.455] [-1.476] 
10 -0.007 0.001 -0.004 0.004 0.006 0.005 -0.011 -0.005 -0.010 
 [-1.459] [0.095] [-0.682] [3.275] [5.077] [3.914] [-2.383] [-0.967] [-1.537] 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Experience FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Education FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country-Experience Trend No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No 
Country-Experience FE No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 5,229 5,229 5,229 5,229 5,229 5,229 5,229 5,229 5,229 
R-Squared 0.820 0.828 0.835 0.365 0.428 0.442 0.846 0.858 0.863 
Source Author’s analysis using ECHPS 1995-2001 and SILC 2004-2015 for 1987-2014 
graduation cohorts. 
Notes: 
 a. These are the scarring estimates from Equations 1-3 for wages, earnings and hours worked for 
all employees in my sample.  
b. The equation estimated is the column number. T-statistics are in parentheses. Standard errors 







Table A2: Hourly wage scarring results, main estimates by educational attainment 
 Non-College College 
Years Since Graduation (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
1 0.021 0.005 -0.009 -0.021 -0.023 -0.024 
 [2.475] [0.509] [-0.725] [-3.419] [-3.412] [-3.321] 
2 0.006 -0.007 -0.010 -0.017 -0.019 -0.021 
 [0.820] [-0.819] [-1.197] [-4.754] [-4.826] [-5.337] 
3 0.005 -0.006 -0.004 -0.017 -0.018 -0.019 
 [0.730] [-0.789] [-0.546] [-4.607] [-4.853] [-4.528] 
4 -0.000 -0.008 -0.001 -0.017 -0.018 -0.016 
 [-0.059] [-1.293] [-0.245] [-4.263] [-4.456] [-3.647] 
5 -0.003 -0.008 -0.000 -0.015 -0.015 -0.015 
 [-0.478] [-1.334] [-0.071] [-3.681] [-3.787] [-3.286] 
6 -0.006 -0.008 -0.002 -0.013 -0.013 -0.010 
 [-1.077] [-1.715] [-0.383] [-2.872] [-2.840] [-1.707] 
7 -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 -0.013 -0.013 -0.013 
 [-1.228] [-1.291] [-0.848] [-2.852] [-2.617] [-2.090] 
8 -0.009 -0.006 -0.005 -0.014 -0.013 -0.015 
 [-1.626] [-1.134] [-0.812] [-2.788] [-2.363] [-2.354] 
9 -0.008 -0.003 -0.007 -0.014 -0.014 -0.011 
 [-1.691] [-0.653] [-1.142] [-3.275] [-2.459] [-1.788] 
10 -0.011 -0.004 -0.009 -0.008 -0.008 -0.010 
 [-2.198] [-0.695] [-1.189] [-1.573] [-1.182] [-1.435] 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Experience FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Education FE N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Country-Experience Trend No Yes No No Yes No 
Country-Experience FE No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 2,622 2,622 2,622 2,607 2,607 2,607 
R-Squared 0.809 0.844 0.853 0.879 0.883 0.887 
Source Author’s analysis using ECHPS 1995-2001 and SILC 2004-2015 for 1987-2014 
graduation cohorts. 
Notes:  
a. These are the scarring estimates from Equations 1-3 for wages for employees with and 
without college degrees.  
b. Models are estimated separately for college and non-college educated employees. The 








Table A3: Wage scarring results, reduced form estimates by educational attainment 
 Non-College College 
Years Since Simulated 
Graduation (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
1 0.025 0.022 0.023 -0.019 -0.015 -0.016 
 [1.989] [1.729] [1.571] [-2.223] [-1.510] [-1.458] 
2 0.006 0.004 0.005 -0.015 -0.012 -0.016 
 [0.665] [0.322] [0.381] [-2.491] [-1.752] [-2.287] 
3 0.014 0.009 0.008 -0.016 -0.014 -0.016 
 [1.601] [0.971] [0.713] [-2.834] [-2.428] [-2.305] 
4 0.009 0.005 0.006 -0.017 -0.016 -0.012 
 [1.264] [0.637] [0.665] [-2.980] [-2.872] [-1.631] 
5 0.004 0.000 -0.000 -0.014 -0.014 -0.014 
 [0.656] [0.084] [-0.015] [-2.941] [-3.056] [-2.234] 
6 0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.013 -0.014 -0.008 
 [0.230] [-0.464] [-0.249] [-2.515] [-2.670] [-1.091] 
7 0.001 -0.002 -0.006 -0.012 -0.014 -0.016 
 [0.196] [-0.425] [-0.848] [-2.480] [-2.625] [-2.205] 
8 -0.002 -0.005 -0.004 -0.014 -0.017 -0.022 
 [-0.348] [-0.798] [-0.471] [-2.776] [-2.762] [-2.874] 
9 -0.002 -0.004 -0.005 -0.014 -0.019 -0.016 
 [-0.301] [-0.629] [-0.682] [-3.146] [-2.879] [-2.251] 
10 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.008 -0.014 -0.016 
 [-1.116] [-0.965] [-0.776] [-1.455] [-1.755] [-2.042] 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Experience FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Education FE N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Country-Experience Trend No Yes No No Yes No 
Country-Experience FE No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 2,453 2,453 2,453 2,435 2,435 2,435 
R-Squared 0.821 0.848 0.856 0.884 0.890 0.894 






a. These are the scarring estimates from Equations 1-3 for wages for employees with and 
without college degrees. Models are estimated separately for college and non-college 
educated employees. The equation estimated is the column number.  
b. The cohort unemployment rate is replaced with the instrument, an age-educational based 
unemployment rate.  
c. T-statistics are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the country-cohort 
graduation level.   
 
Table A4: Wage scarring results, instrumental variable estimates by educational attainment 
 Non-College College 
Years Since Simulated 
Graduation (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
1 0.007 0.006 0.003 -0.015 -0.013 -0.016 
 [0.786] [0.617] [0.295] [-2.547] [-1.932] [-2.361] 
2 0.012 0.009 0.003 -0.016 -0.015 -0.016 
 [1.463] [0.995] [0.277] [-2.943] [-2.635] [-2.535] 
3 0.009 0.006 0.007 -0.017 -0.016 -0.012 
 [1.431] [0.891] [0.846] [-3.011] [-2.948] [-1.824] 
4 0.005 0.002 0.003 -0.015 -0.015 -0.012 
 [0.799] [0.272] [0.430] [-2.966] [-3.097] [-2.171] 
5 0.002 -0.002 0.000 -0.013 -0.014 -0.009 
 [0.316] [-0.402] [0.034] [-2.594] [-2.734] [-1.248] 
6 0.001 -0.003 -0.004 -0.013 -0.015 -0.017 
 [0.179] [-0.537] [-0.645] [-2.640] [-2.728] [-2.379] 
7 -0.002 -0.006 -0.005 -0.014 -0.017 -0.021 
 [-0.445] [-1.030] [-0.682] [-2.930] [-2.860] [-2.990] 
8 -0.003 -0.006 -0.008 -0.014 -0.018 -0.016 
 [-0.535] [-0.973] [-1.095] [-3.192] [-2.888] [-2.292] 
9 -0.006 -0.009 -0.009 -0.008 -0.013 -0.016 
 [-1.194] [-1.277] [-1.115] [-1.627] [-1.812] [-2.207] 
10 -0.011 -0.004 -0.009 -0.008 -0.008 -0.010 
 [-2.198] [-0.695] [-1.189] [-1.573] [-1.182] [-1.435] 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Experience FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Education FE N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Country-Experience Trend No Yes No No Yes No 
Country-Experience FE No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 2,453 2,453 2,453 2,435 2,435 2,435 




Source Author’s analysis using ECHPS 1995-2001 and SILC 2004-2015 for 1987-2014 
graduation cohorts. 
Notes:  
a. These are the wage scarring estimates from estimating Equations 5 (first stage) and 6 
(second stage) by 2SLS for employees with and without college degrees. The age-
educational unemployment rate is used as an instrument for the cohort unemployment 
rate.  
b. Models are estimated separately for college and non-college educated employees. 




























Table 7: Wage scarring results, IV estimates without high migration countries 
 Non-College College 
Years Since Simulated 
Graduation (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
1 0.039 0.045 0.062 -0.019 -0.016 -0.020 
 [2.529] [2.425] [3.055] [-2.066] [-1.386] [-1.566] 
2 0.009 0.014 0.009 -0.014 -0.011 -0.014 
 [0.814] [0.938] [0.542] [-2.077] [-1.413] [-1.637] 
3 0.014 0.015 0.007 -0.015 -0.014 -0.016 
 [1.358] [1.176] [0.467] [-2.425] [-2.022] [-2.045] 
4 0.011 0.010 0.010 -0.016 -0.015 -0.010 
 [1.314] [1.075] [1.003] [-2.465] [-2.328] [-1.310] 
5 0.006 0.004 0.005 -0.013 -0.013 -0.011 
 [0.765] [0.500] [0.580] [-2.346] [-2.434] [-1.624] 
6 0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.012 -0.013 -0.008 
 [0.211] [-0.299] [-0.070] [-2.054] [-2.219] [-0.921] 
7 0.000 -0.004 -0.006 -0.011 -0.013 -0.015 
 [0.071] [-0.588] [-0.774] [-2.016] [-2.195] [-1.909] 
8 -0.003 -0.008 -0.007 -0.013 -0.016 -0.021 
 [-0.465] [-1.131] [-0.817] [-2.387] [-2.434] [-2.658] 
9 -0.004 -0.009 -0.011 -0.013 -0.017 -0.015 
 [-0.590] [-1.200] [-1.255] [-2.532] [-2.438] [-1.946] 
10 -0.008 -0.013 -0.011 -0.007 -0.012 -0.015 
 [-1.226] [-1.518] [-1.247] [-1.185] [-1.495] [-1.881] 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Experience FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Education FE N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Country-Experience Trend No Yes No No Yes No 
Country-Experience FE No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 1,928 1,928 1,928 1,912 1,912 1,912 
R-Squared 0.807 0.835 0.844 0.885 0.891 0.894 
Source Author’s analysis using ECHPS 1995-2001 and SILC 2004-2015 for 1987-2014 
graduation cohorts. 
Notes:  
a. These are the wage scarring estimates from estimating Equations 5 (first stage) and 6 
(second stage) by 2SLS for employees with and without college degrees. The age-
educational unemployment rate is used as an instrument for the cohort unemployment 
rate.  
b. Models are estimated separately for college and non-college educated employees. I 
exclude countries with the most international mobile native populations- Greece, Portugal 




c. T-statistics are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the country-cohort 
graduation level.  
